GRAVITY PROBE B PROCEDURE FOR SCIENCE MISSION DEWAR

Verify Helium Cylinder Content/Connect Helium Supply Line

To be performed at Vandenberg Air Force Base building 1610 or MST WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS P1014

June 29, 2002

Written by:		Checked by:	
	Date	-	Date
Ned Calder Cryogenic Test		Dave Murray Cryogenic Test	
Approvals:			
	Date		Date
Dorrene Ross Quality Assurance		Harv Moskowitz LM Safety	
	Date		Date
Rob Brumley Payload Technical Mar	nager	Mike Taber Test Director	
	Date		
NASA/KSC Safety			

Verify Helium Cylinder Content/Connect Helium Supply Line

Gravity Probe B Program P1014 rev -

Revision Record

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMI American Magnetics Inc. MTVC Main Tank Vent Cap ATC Advanced Technology Center MTVC-G Main Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge Aux Auxiliary MTVC-RV Main Tank Vent Cap relief valve AV-x Valve x of Gas Module auxiliary MTVC-V Main Tank Vent Cap valve section Bot Bottom NBP Normal boiling point CN [xx] Data acquisition channel number ONR Office of Naval Research
Aux Auxiliary MTVC-RV Main Tank Vent Cap relief valve AV-x Valve x of Gas Module auxiliary section Bot Bottom NBP Normal boiling point
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AV-x Valve x of Gas Module auxiliary MTVC-V Main Tank Vent Cap valve section Bot Bottom NBP Normal boiling point
section Bot Bottom NBP Normal boiling point
CN [xx] Data acquisition channel number ONR Office of Naval Research
DAS Data Acquisition System PFCG Fill Cap assembly pressure Gauge
EFM Exhaust gas Flow Meter PFM Pump equipment Flow Meter
EG-x Gauge x of Gas Module exhaust PG-x Gauge x of Pump equipment
section
EM Electrical Module PM Pump Module
ERV-x Relief valve of Gas Module exhaust psi pounds per square inch
section EV-x Valve number x of Gas Module psig pounds per square inch gauge
exhaust section
FCV Fill Cap Valve PTD Payload Test Director
FIST Full Integrated System Test PV-x Valve x of the Pump equipment
GHe Gaseous Helium QA Quality Assurance
GM Gas Module RAV-x Remote Actuated Valve-x
GP-B Gravity Probe-B RGA Residual Gas Analyzer
GSE Ground Support Equipment SMD Science Mission Dewar
GT Guard Tank STV SMD Thruster vent Valve
GTVC Guard Tank Vent Cap SU Stanford University
GTVC-G Guard Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge SV-x SMD Valve number x
GTVC-RV Guard Tank Vent Cap relief valve TG-x Gauge x of Utility Turbo System GTVC-V Guard Tank Vent Cap valve TV-x Valve x of Utility Turbo System
GTV-G Guard Tank vent Cap valve TV-x Valve x of Offility Turbo System GTV-G Guard Tank vent pressure gauge UTS Utility Turbo System
GTV-RV Guard Tank vent relief valve Vac Vacuum
GTV-V Guard Tank vent valve VCP-x Vent cap pressure gauge
HX-x Vent line heat exchanger in Gas VCRV-x Vent cap pleasane gadge
Module
KFxx Quick connect o-ring vacuum flange VCV-x Vent cap valve (xx mm diameter)
LHe Liquid Helium VDC Volts Direct Current
LHSD Liquid Helium Supply Dewar VF-x Liquid helium Fill line valve
Liq Liquid VG-x Gauge x of Vacuum Module
LL Liquid level VM Vacuum Module
LLS Liquid level sensor VV-x Valve x of Vacuum Module
LMMS Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space VW-x Valve x of Dewar Adapter
LMSC Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.

LIST OF SPECIFIC HEADING DEFINITIONS

Each type of alert message will precede the procedural step to which it applies

- 1. NOTE: Used to indicate an operating procedure of such importance that it must be emphasized
- 2. CAUTION: Used to identify hazards to equipment
- 3. WARNING: Used to identify hazards to personnel

A. SCOPE

This procedure describes the steps necessary to verify the purity of any source of helium gas used for GP-B cryogenic operations and to connect it to the Guard Tank or the Gas Module.

A Gow-Mac thermal conductivity meter is used to verify the purity of the helium gas. If this meter is not available, a second option is provided to verify the purity of the helium gas using a helium leak detector.

A hazardous operation contained in this procedure is the handling of cryogenic nitrogen to service the leak detector.

B. **SAFETY**

B.1. Potential Hazards

Personal injury and hardware damage can result during normal positioning, assembly and disassembly of hardware.

Liquid helium used in the SMD represents a hazardous material for the personnel involved in the operations. Cryogenic burns can be caused by contact with the cold liquid or gas, high pressures can result if boiling liquid or cold gas is confined without a vent path, and asphyxiation can result if the vent gas is allowed to accumulate.

The SMD Safety Compliance Assessment, document GPB-100153C and the Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package LM/P479945 discuss the safety design, operating requirements and the hazard analysis of the SMD.

B.2. Mitigation of Hazards

B.2.1. Lifting hazards

There are no lifting operations in this procedure

B.2.2. Cryogenic Hazards

In VAFB building 1610, there may be an oxygen deficiency monitor that alarms when the oxygen level is reduced to 19.5%. In addition, the GP-B cryogenic team provides an oxygen deficiency monitor that alarms when the oxygen level is reduced to 19.5%. Additional temperature and pressure alarms, provided by the DAS, warn of potential over-pressure conditions. Emergency vent line deflectors are installed over the four burst disks to direct any flow to an outside area.

Only authorized and trained personnel are allowed in VAFB facilities without escort. All personnel working on platforms at a height 30 inches or more off the floor are required to have an approved air tank (emergency breathing apparatus) within easy reach. Note that tank need not be kept available when working from ladder. In the unlikely event of a large LHe spill all employees have been instructed to evacuate the

room and contact NASA and VAFB safety. The fall back area to be used in the event of building evacuation is building 1605.

The following additional requirements apply to all personnel involved directly in cryogenic operations. Gloves that are impervious to liquid helium and liquid nitrogen are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing or impingement of high-velocity cryogens exists or when handling equipment that has been cooled to cryogenic temperatures. Protective clothing, non-absorbent shoes and full-face shields with goggles/glasses are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing cryogens exists.

B.2.3. Other Hazards

All tools or other items used with the potential to damage the SMD or Probe shall be tethered.

B.3. Mishap Notification

B.3.1. Injury

In the event of fire or illness/injury requiring emergency medical treatment **Dial 911**

B.3.2. Hardware Mishap

In case of an accident, incident, or mishap, notification is to proceed per the procedures outlined in Lockheed Martin Engineering Memorandum EM SYS229 and Stanford University GP-B P0879. Additionally, VAFB NASA Safety and 30th Space Wing Safety will be notified as required.

B.3.3. Contingency Response

Responses to contingencies/emergencies (e.g., power failure) are listed in Appendix 3.

C. QUALITY ASSURANCE

C.1. QA Notification

The NASA program and NASA safety representative and SU QA shall be notified 24 hours prior to the start of this procedure. Upon completion of this procedure, the QE Manager will certify his/her concurrence that the effort was performed and accomplished in accordance with the prescribed instructions by signing and dating in the designated place(s) in this document.

C.2. Red-line Authority

Authority to red-line (make minor changes during execution) this procedure is given solely to the PTD or his designate and shall be approved by the QA Representative. Additionally, approval by the Payload Technical Manager shall be required, if in the judgement of the PTD or QA Representative, experiment functionality may be affected. Within hazardous portions of this procedure, all

steps shall be worked in sequence. Out-of-sequence work or redlines shall be approved by NASA Safety prior to their performance.

C.3. **Discrepancies**

A Quality Assurance Representative designated by D. Ross shall review any discrepancy noted during this procedure, and approve its disposition. Discrepancies will be recorded in a D-log or a DR per Quality Plan P0108. Any time a procedure calls for verification of a specific configuration and that configuration is not the current configuration, it represents a discrepancy of one of three types. These types are to be dealt with as described below.

- 1. If the discrepancy has minimal effect on procedure functionality (such as the state of a valve that is irrelevant to performance of the procedure) it shall be documented in the procedure, together with the resolution. Redlines to procedures are included in this category.
- 2. If the discrepancy is minor and affects procedure functionality but not flight hardware fit or function, it shall be recorded in the D-log. Resolution shall be in consultation with the PTD and approved by the QA representative.
- 3. All critical and major discrepancies, those that effect flight hardware fit or functions, shall be documented in a D-log and also in a Discrepancy Report, per P0108.

D. **TEST PERSONNEL**

D.1. Personnel Responsibilities

The performance of this procedure requires a minimum complement of personnel as determined by the Test Director. The person performing the operations (Test Director or Test Engineer) is to sign the "Completed by" sign-off. Any other qualified person or QA person who can attest to the successful performance of this procedure may sign the "Witnessed by" sign-off. The Test Director will perform Pre-Test and Post-Test Briefings in accordance with P0875 "GP-B Maintenance and Testing at all Facilities." Checklists will be used as directed by P0875

D.2. Personnel Qualifications

The Test Director must have a detailed understanding of all procedures and facility operations and experience in all of the SMD operations. Test Engineers must have SMD Cryogenic operations experience and an understanding of the operations and procedures used for the cryogenic servicing/maintenance of the Dewar.

D.3. Required Personnel

The following personnel are essential to the accomplishment of this procedure:

FUNCTIONAL TITLE	NUMBER	<u>AFFILIATION</u>
Test Director/Test Engineer	1	Stanford
GP-B Quality Assurance	1	Stanford
NASA Safety Rep	1	SFAO or ANALEX

E. REQUIREMENTS

E.1. Electrostatic Discharge Requirements

When working on the space vehicle, proper ESD protection is required. ESD wrist-straps will be checked on a calibrated checker prior to use.

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E.2. Lifting Operation Requirements

There are no lifting operations in this procedure

E.3. Hardware/Software Requirements

E.3.1. Commercial Test Equipment

No commercial test equipment is required for this operation.

E.3.2. Ground Support Equipment

The Ground Support Equipment includes the Gas Module, the Electrical Module. The Gas Module provides the capability to configure vent paths, read pressures and flow rates, and pump and backfill vent lines. The Pump Module provides greater pumping capacity than the Gas Module, together with additional flow metering capabilities. The vent output of the Gas Module flows through the Pump Module. The Electrical Module contains the instruments listed in Table 1, and provides remote control of valves in the Gas Module, Pump Module, and SMD.

E.3.3. Computers and Software:

The Data Acquisition System (DAS) is required for this procedure. The DAS reads and displays pressures, temperatures, and flow rates and monitors critical parameters. No additional computers or software are required.

E.3.4. Additional Test Equipment

Description		
GOW MAC Gas Analyzer		
Helium leak detector:		
S/N#:		
Cal Leak Due Date:		

E.3.5. Additional Hardware

Description

Ultra High Purity High Pressure Regulators
1/4' poly hose
4 liter thermos

E.3.6. Personnel Protective Equipment

- 1. Cryogenic safety gloves and apron
- 2. Face Shield
- 3. Goggles/glasses
- 4. Non-absorbent shoes
- 5. Rubber Gloves (if ethanol is used)
- E.3.7. Tools: N/A
- E.3.8. Expendables

WARNING

Ethanol is highly flammable and vapor/air mixtures are Explosive.

Exposure hazards include: Inhalation (headache/fatigue),

skin (dryness, eyes (redness/pain/burning)

Description	Quantity	Mfr./Part No.
Ethanol	AR	N/A
99.999% pure gaseous helium	AR	N/A
Snoop liquid leak detector	AR	Swagelok

E.4. Instrument Pretest Requirements

The GSE instruments required to perform this procedure are listed in Table 1, together with their serial numbers, where available. Instruments that are required to have current calibrations are indicated in the Cal-Required column. Instruments that do not require calibration are those not used to verify performance requirements and are not connected to flight instrumentation. The status column is to be filled in with the due date of the instrument calibration sticker and verified to be in calibration by QE or QE designee.

Table 1. Required Instrumentation and Calibration Status

No.	Location	Description	Name	Serial No.	Cal Required	Status Cal due date
1	DAS	Power Supply, H-P 6627A	-	3452A01975	Yes	
2	DAS	Power Supply, H-P 6627A	-	3452A01956	Yes	
3	DAS	Data Acquisition/Control Unit H-P 3497A	-	2936A245539	No	-
4	DAS	Digital Multimeter H-P 3458A	-	2823A15047	Yes	
5	EM	Vacuum Gauge Controller Granville-Phillips Model 316	EG-1a, -1b	2827	No	-

No.	Location	Description	Name	Serial No.	Cal Required	Status Cal due date
6	EM	Vacuum Gauge Controller Granville-Phillips Model 316	AG-2a, -2b	2826	No	-
7	EM	Vacuum Gauge Controller Granville-Phillips Model 316	EG-3	2828	No	-
8	EM	MKS PDR-C-2C	EG-2, FCG	92022108A	No	-
9	EM	Flow meter – Matheson 8170	EFM-1	96186	No	-
10	EM	Flow meter totalizer Matheson 8124	EFM-1	96174	No	-
11	EM	Liquid Helium Level Controller American Magnetics, Inc. 136	LLS Main Tank	96-409-11	No	-
12	EM	Liquid Helium Level Controller American Magnetics, Inc. 136	LLS Guard Tank	96-409-10	No	-
13	EM	Liquid Helium Level Controller American Magnetics, Inc. 136	LLS Well	96-409-9	No	-
14	EM	Liquid Helium Level Controller American Magnetics, Inc. 136	LLS Axial Lock	96-409-12	No	-
15	EM	Pressure Controller – MKS 152F-92	EV-7a, -7b	96203410A	No	-
16	EM	Power Supply HP 6038A	H08D Tank Heater	96023407A	Yes	
17	EM	Power Supply HP 6038A	H09D Tank Heater	3511A-13332	Yes	
18	EM	Power Supply HP 6038A	RAV Power Supply	3329A-12486	Yes	
19	EM	Vac Ion Pump power supply Varian 929-0910, Minivac	SIP	5004N	No	-
20	EM	Flow meter totalizer Veeder-Root	PFM-1	576013-716	No	-
21	GM	Pressure Gauge, Heise	AG-1	CC-122077	No	-
22	GM	Pressure Gauge, Marshall Town	AG-3	N/A	No	-
23	GM	Main Tank Heat Exchanger: a) Thermocouple, b) Current meter, c) Temperature set point controller	-	C-19950	No	-
24	GM	Guard Tank Heat Exchanger: a) Thermocouple, b) Current meter, c) Temperature set point controller	-	C-09920	No	-
25	VM	Vacuum Gauge readout, Granville-Phillips 316	VG-3 VG-4	2878	No	-
26	VM	Vacuum Gauge readout, Granville-Phillips 360	VG-1, VG-2 VG-5	96021521	No	-
27	NA	Gow-Mac Gas Analyzer			Yes	

E.5. Configuration Requirements

E.5.1. Main Tank

There are no special requirements for the Main Tank

E.5.2. Guard Tank

There are no special requirements for the Guard Tank.

E.5.3. Well

The Well is evacuated.

E.5.4. Vacuum Shell

There is no requirement for the vacuum shell pressure.

E.5.5. Alarm System

- 1. The DAS alarm system may be enabled and contain the following alarm set-points:
 - a. Top of lead bag temperature set (CN 28 and CN 29) at T \leq 6.0 K.
 - b. Relative Guard Tank Pressure (CN 46) set at $P \ge 0.3$ torr.
- The TM&A may also be enabled during transport operations. The Guard Tank pressure must be alarmed at P ≥ 0.3 torr on the TM&A if in use.

E.5.6. GSE

1. GSE cabling must be connected between the SMD and the Electrical Module (P/N 5833812) and between the SMD and the Data Acquisition System (P/N 5833811).

E.6. Optional Non-flight Configurations

The following modifications or non-flight arrangement of the basic SMD configuration may also be in place. They are incidental to the performance of this procedure and not required.

- 1. The SMD is installed in its transportation and test fixture.
- 2. The ion-pump magnet is installed.
- 3. The Vacuum shell pump out port at SV-6 may be connected to the Vacuum Module (P/N 5833816) via a 2-in valve and pumping line, with the valve in either the closed position or in the open position with the Vacuum Module actively pumping the vacuum shell.
- 4. The Fill Cap Assembly is installed at SV-13.

F. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

F.1. **Drawings**

Drawing No.	Title
LMMS-5833394	Instrumentation Installation

F.2. Supporting documentation

Document No.	Title
LMMC-5835031	GP-B Magnetic Control Plan
GPB-100153C	SMD Safety Compliance Assessment
LM/P479945	Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package
SU/GP-B P0141	FIST Emergency Procedures
LMSC-P088357	Science Mission Dewar Critical Design Review
SU/GP-B P0108	Quality Plan

SU/GP-B P059	GP-B Contamination Control Plan	
EWR 127-1	Eastern and Western Range Safety Requirements	
EM SYS229	Accident/Mishap/Incident Notification Process	
KHB 1710.2 rev E	Kennedy Space Center Safety Practices Handbook	

F.3. Additional Procedures

Document No. Title	
SU/GP-B P0879	Accident/Incident/Mishap Notification Process
SU/GP-B P0875	GP-B Maintenance and Testing at all Facilities

		Operation Number:
		Date Initiated:
		Time Initiated:
G.	OPEI	RATIONS
.	G.1.	Pre-Operations Verifications
		o Verify SU QA notified.
		Record: Individual notified,
		Date/time
		o Verify NASA program representative notified.
		Record: Individual notified,
		o Verify NASA safety representative notified.
		Record: Individual notified,
		o Record calibration due dates in Table 1 (Sections. E.3.4, E.4)
		o Persons actually performing this procedure should initial their names in Sec D.3 and the name of the Test Director should be circled.
		o Verify completion of the Pre-Operations Checklist (Appendix 1).
		o Verify proper operation of the GP-B Cryogenic Group oxygen monitor
		o Verify availability and functioning of emergency shower
		QA Witness:
	G.2.	Initial Operations
		G.2.1. Verify bottle/s to be tested have label identifying them as pure helium, grade 5.0 or better.
		QA Witness:
		G.2.2. Record serial number on helium bottle/s to be tested.
		1 2 3 4 5 6

G.2.3. Record method of verifying purity of helium bottles.

NOTE:

The preferable method for verifying the purity of any source of helium gas is by use of the Gow-Mac Gas Analyzer. However, if the Gas Analyzer is not available (as to be noted below) a second option is provided using a helium leak detector.

- o Gow-Mac Binary Gas Analyzer-Proceed to section G.3
- o Bottles have already been tested:

Record Opt #:	
Record Date:	
Proceed to section G.5, skipping G.3 and G.4	
Helium Leak Detector-Proceed to section G.4	

Explain reason for not using Gas	
Analyzer:	

QA Witnesss:				
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G.3. Verify purity of helium gas with Gow-Mac Binary Gas Analyzer

- G.3.1. Place power mode switch in desired position, 'Bat' or 'Line Charge'
- G.3.2. Adjust rotary switch to most sensitive range.
- G.3.3. Attach certified 99.999% pure helium supply to meter.
- G.3.4. Purge certified 99.999% pure gas through the meter.
- G.3.5. Adjust zero control so that the meter reads "0" on the scale.
- G.3.6. Attach calibrated mixture (5% air in helium) of gas to the analyzer.
- G.3.7. Purge calibrated mixture through the analyzer.
- G.3.8. Adjust Calibration Trimmer until the meter indicates gas composition (5% air in helium).
- G.3.9. Attach gas to be tested to analyzer.
- G.3.10. If using a six pack, verify all six bottles are open for testing.
- G.3.11. Allow meter to sample gas for a minimum of 30 seconds.
- G.3.12. Verify that the gas being tested is less than .1% air in helium.
- G.3.13. Disconnect helium source from gas meter.
- G.3.14. Place blue indicator label on bottles tested indicating that their purity has been verified.

G.3.15. Proceed to section G.5

QA	Witness:		

WARNING

The following steps contain hazardous operations. When filling the nitrogen trap in the leak detector, wear cryogenic safety apron, gloves, face shield with goggles/glasses, and non-absorbent shoes. Failure to comply may result in personal injury.

- G.4. Option- Verify purity of helium gas with helium leak detector.
 - G.4.1. Request NASA Safety make a PA announcement that a hazardous task is about to begin.
 - G.4.2. Establish a 6 foot controlled area.
 - G.4.3. Ensure all nonessential personnel are clear of the area
 - G.4.4. Request the area operational light be changed to Amber
 - G.4.5. Turn on leak detector and pump-out test port.
 - G.4.6. Record calibrated standard leak:_____
 - G.4.7. Record measured standard leak:
 - G.4.8. Verify measured and standard are within 2% full scale of each other.
 - G.4.9. Vent test port and attach Varian Super Probe nozzle.
 - G.4.10. Begin pumping on probe nozzle
 - G.4.11. Record Background:
 - G.4.12. If using a six pack, verify all six bottles are open.
 - G.4.13. Flow gas to be verified into probe nozzle.
 - G.4.14. Verify leak detector goes immediately to gross leak check mode.
 - G.4.15. Place blue label on bottles tested indicating that their purity has been verified.

Note:

The hazardous operations are now complete. Make PA announcement that hazardous operations are now over. Disband control area and turn area warning light to green.

QA	Witness:	
QΑ	witness:	

G.5. Connect verified helium source to desired location

- G.5.1. Attach high purity regulator to bottles to used.
- G.5.2. Connect helium source line to regulator.

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- G.5.3. Use Snoop solution or equivalent to leak check regulator connections.
- G.5.4. Purge helium source line for one minute.
- G.5.5. Record hardware helium supply line to be attached to and perform connection.

o Guard Tank at GTVA	Record set pressure on
	supply regulator :psig
	Purge from both directions while making connection
	3. Snoop leak check final connection
o He Gas Supply In port on Gas Module and regulate Guard Tank pressure with APR-2	Record means of pressurizing Guard Tank (APR-2V or EV-23):
	2. Record APR-2 settting:
	3. Purge Gas Moduleas app for 2 minutes.
	4. If appropriate purge from both directions before making final connection.
	5. Snoop leak check all final connections
G.6. Verify completion of Post Operat	QA Witness:ions Checklist
H. PROCEDURE COMPLETION	
Completed by:	
Witnessed by:	
Date:	
Time:	
Quality Manager	
	Date




Figure 1 Gas Module




Figure 2-Schematic diagram of the Pump Module




Figure 3. Schematic diagram of Utility Pumping System (UTS)





Figure 4. Schematic of Science Mission Dewar plumbing.

Figure 5- Possible Main Tank and Guard Tank Vent Configurations



APPENDIX 1 PRE OPERATIONS CHECKLIST

1. Verify the test procedure being used is the latest revision. 2. Verify all critical items in the test are identified and discussed with the test team. 3. Verify all required materials and tools are available in the test area. 4. Verify all hazardous materials involved in the test are identified to the test team. 5. Verify all hazardous steps to be performed are identified to the test team. 6. Verify each team member is certified for the task being performed and knows their responsibilities. 7. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she has the authority to stop the test if an item in the procedure is not clear. 8. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she must stop the test if there is any anomaly or suspected anomaly. 9. Notify management of all discrepancy reports or d-log items identified during procedure performance. In the event an incident or major discrepancy occurs during procedure performance management will be notified immediately. 10. Verify/Perform pre-task engineering/safety high bay walk down. Verify noted discrepancies have been corrected. 11. Confirm that each test team member understands that there will be a post-test team meeting. Team Lead Signature:	DATE	CHECKLIST ITEM	COMPLETED	REMARKS
identified and discussed with the test team. 3. Verify all required materials and tools are available in the test area. 4. Verify all hazardous materials involved in the test are identified to the test team. 5. Verify all hazardous steps to be performed are identified to the test team. 6. Verify each team member is certified for the task being performed and knows their responsibilities. 7. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she has the authority to stop the test if an item in the procedure is not clear. 8. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she must stop the test if there is any anomaly or suspected anomaly. 9. Notify management of all discrepancy reports or d-log items identified during procedure performance. In the event an incident or major discrepancy occurs during procedure performance management will be notified immediately. 10. Verify/Perform pre-task engineering/safety high bay walk down. Verify noted discrepancies have been corrected.				
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Team Lead Signature:		understands that there will be a post-test		
		Team Lead Signature:		

Verify Helium Cylinder Content/Connect Helium Supply Line

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APPENDIX 2 POST OPERATIONS CHECKLIST

DATE	CHECKLIST ITEM	COMPLETED	REMARKS
	Verify all steps in the procedure were successfully completed.		
	2. Verify all anomalies discovered during testing are properly documented.		
	3. Ensure management has been notified of all major or minor discrepancies.		
	4. Ensure that all steps that were not required to be performed are properly identified.		
	5. If applicable sign-off test completion.		
	Team Lead Signature:		

K. APPENDIX 3- CONTINGENCY RESPONSES

Condition	Circumstance	Response
Power failure	Anytime	Suspend any operations requiring power (e.g., use of the leak detector) until power is resumed.
Burst disk rupture (MT/GT)	Anytime	Evacuate room. If above floor, don escape breathing apparatus prior to egress.
Main Tank or Guard Tank liquid level falls below alarm limit	Anytime	Configure Dewar and Fill as appropriate
Oxygen Meter Alarm	Anytime	Evacuate Room
Liquid Nitrogen Spill	Anytime	Clear area until all spilled liquid evaporates