

Gravity Probe B Procedure for GSE Certification

DISCONNECT TM&A FROM SMD

To be performed at Vandenberg Air Force Base building 1610

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NON HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS

P1012

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REVISION RECORD

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Table of Contents

A	SCOPE	6
B	SAFETY	6
	B.1 POTENTIAL HAZARDS	6
	B.2 MITIGATION OF HAZARDS	6
	B.3 MISHAP NOTIFICATION	7
C	QUALITY ASSURANCE	7
	C.1 QA NOTIFICATION	7
	C.2 RED-LINE AUTHORITY	7
	C.3 DISCREPANCIES	7
D	TEST PERSONNEL	8
	D.1 PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES	8
	D.2 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS	8
	D.3 REQUIRED PERSONNEL	8
E	REQUIREMENTS	8
	E.1 ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS	8
	E.2 LIFTING OPERATION REQUIREMENTS	8
	E.3 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS	9
	E.4 ADDITIONAL TEST EQUIPMENT	9
	E.5 CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS	9
F	REFERENCE DOCUMENTS	10
	F.1 DRAWINGS	10
	F.2 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION	10
	F.3 ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES	10
G	OPERATIONS	11
	G.1 PRE-OPERATIONS VERIFICATIONS	11
	G.2 VERIFY CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS	11
	G.3 DISCONNECT TM&A TO SMD	13
H	PROCEDURE COMPLETION	14
I	APPENDIX 1 PRETEST CHECKLIST	18
J	APPENDIX 2 POST-TEST CHECKLIST	19
K	APPENDIX 3- CONTINGENCY/EMERGENCY RESPONSES	20

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AG-x	Gauge x of Gas Module auxiliary section	MT	Main Tank
AMI	American Magnetics Inc.	MTVC	Main Tank Vent Cap
AP-1	Vane Pump in Gas module	MTVC-G	Main Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge
APR-x	Pressure regulator x of Gas Module	MTVC-RV	Main Tank Vent Cap relief valve
AV-x	Valve x of Gas Module auxiliary section	MTVC-V	Main Tank Vent Cap valve
CG-x	Gauge x of portable helium pressurization source	NBP	Normal boiling point
CPR-x	Pressure regulator x of portable helium pressurization source	ONR	Office of Naval Research
CV-x	Valve x of portable helium pressurization source	PFCG	Fill Cap assembly pressure Gauge
CN [xx]	Data acquisition channel number	PFM	Pump equipment Flow Meter
DAS	Data Acquisition System	PG-x	Gauge x of Pump equipment
EFM-x	Exhaust gas Flow Meters	PM	Pump Module
EG-x	Gauge x of Gas Module exhaust section	psi	pounds per square inch
EH-x	Vent line heat exchanger in GM	psig	pounds per square inch gauge
EM	Electrical Module	TD	Test Director
ERV-x	Relief valve of GM exhaust section	PV-x	Valve x of the Pump equipment
EV-x	Valve number x of Gas Module exhaust section	QA	Quality Assurance
FCV	Fill Cap Valve	RAV-x	Remote Actuated Valve-x
FIST	Full Integrated System Test	RGA	Residual Gas Analyzer
GHe	Gaseous Helium	RGA-LV	RGA leak valve (needle valve)
GM	Gas Module	RGA-SOV	RGA shut off valve
GP-B	Gravity Probe-B	SMD	Science Mission Dewar
GSE	Ground Support Equipment	STV	SMD Thruster vent Valve
GT	Guard Tank	SU	Stanford University
GTVC	Guard Tank Vent Cap	SV-x	SMD Valve number x
GTVC-G	Guard Tank Vent Cap pressure gauge	TG-x	Gauge x of Utility Turbo System
GTVC-RV	Guard Tank Vent Cap relief valve	TV-x	Valve x of Utility Turbo System
GTV-G	Guard Tank vent pressure gauge	UTS	Utility Turbo System
GTV-RV	Guard Tank vent relief valve	Vac	Vacuum
GTV-V	Guard Tank vent valve	VCP-x	Vent cap pressure gauge
GTV-Va	Guard Tank Vent line valve for independent pressure regulation	VCRV-x	Vent cap relief valve
HEX-x	SMD heat exchanger x	VCV-x	Vent cap valve
KFxx	Quick connect o-ring vacuum flange (xx mm diameter)	VDC	Volts Direct Current
LHe	Liquid Helium	VF-x	Liquid helium Fill line valve
LHSD	Liquid Helium Supply Dewar	VG-x	Gauge x of Vacuum Module
LHV-x	Liquid Helium Supply Dewar valves	VM	Vacuum Module
LLS	Liquid level sensor	VV-x	Valve x of Vacuum Module
LM	Lockheed Martin Co.	VW-x	Valve x of Dewar Adapter

LIST OF SPECIFIC HEADING DEFINITIONS

Each type of alert message will precede the procedural step to which it applies

1. NOTE: Used to indicate an operating procedure of such importance that it must be emphasized
2. CAUTION: Used to identify hazards to equipment
3. WARNING: Used to identify hazards to personnel

A SCOPE

This procedure is used to disconnect the Temperature Monitor and Alarm system (TM&A) to the Science Mission Dewar (SMD).

B SAFETY**B.1 Potential Hazards**

Personal injury and hardware damage can result during normal positioning, assembly and disassembly of hardware.

Liquid helium used in the SMD represents a hazardous material for the personnel involved in the operations. Cryogenic burns can be caused by contact with the cold liquid or gas, high pressures can result if boiling liquid or cold gas is confined without a vent path, and asphyxiation can result if the vent gas is allowed to accumulate.

The SMD Safety Compliance Assessment, document GPB-100153C and the Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package LM/P479945 discuss the safety design, operating requirements and the hazard analysis of the SMD.

B.2 Mitigation of Hazards**B.2.1 Lifting Hazards**

There are no lifting operations in this procedure

B.2.2 Cryogenic Hazards

In VAFB building 1610, the GP-B cryogenic team provides an oxygen deficiency monitor that alarms when the oxygen level is reduced to 19.5%. Additional temperature and pressure alarms, provided by the DAS, warn of potential over-pressure conditions. Emergency vent lines are installed over the four burst disks to direct any flow to an outside area.

Only authorized and trained personnel are allowed in VAFB facilities without escort. All personnel working on platforms at a height 30 inches or more off the floor are required to have an approved air tank (emergency breathing apparatus) within easy reach. Note that tank need not be kept available when working from ladder. In the unlikely event of a large LHe spill all employees have been instructed to evacuate the room and contact NASA and VAFB safety.

The following additional requirements apply to all personnel involved directly in cryogenic operations. Gloves that are impervious to liquid helium and liquid nitrogen are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing or impingement of high-velocity cryogenics exists or when handling equipment that has been cooled to cryogenic temperatures. Protective clothing, non-absorbent shoes and full-face shields and eye glasses/goggles are to be worn whenever the possibility of splashing cryogenics exists.

B.2.3 Other Hazards

When appropriate, tools or other items used with the potential to damage the space vehicle shall be tethered.

B.3 Mishap Notification

B.3.1 Injury

In case of any injury obtain medical treatment as follows
VAFB **Call 911**

B.3.2 Hardware Mishap

In case of an accident, incident, or mishap, notification is to proceed per the procedures outlined in Lockheed Martin Engineering Memorandum EM SYS229 and Stanford University GP-B P0879. Additionally, VAFB NASA Safety and 30th Space Wing Safety will be notified as required.

B.3.3 Contingency Response

Responses to contingencies/emergency (e.g., power failure) are listed in Appendix 3.

C QUALITY ASSURANCE

C.1 QA Notification

The NASA program and the NASA safety representative and SU QA shall be notified 24 hours prior to the start of this procedure. Upon completion of this procedure, the QE Manager will certify his/her concurrence that the effort was performed and accomplished in accordance with the prescribed instructions by signing and dating in the designated place(s) in this document.

C.2 Red-line Authority

Authority to red-line (make minor changes during execution) this procedure is given solely to the TD or his designate and shall be approved by the QA Representative. Additionally, approval by the Payload Technical Manager shall be required, if in the judgement of the TD or QA Representative, experiment functionality may be affected.

C.3 Discrepancies

A Quality Assurance Representative designated by D. Ross shall review any discrepancy noted during this procedure, and approve its disposition. Discrepancies will be recorded in a D-log or a DR per Quality Plan P0108. Any time a procedure calls for verification of a specific configuration and that configuration is not the current configuration, it represents a discrepancy of one of three types. These types are to be dealt with as described below.

1. If the discrepancy has minimal effect on procedure functionality (such as the state of a valve that is irrelevant to performance of the procedure) it shall be documented in the procedure, together with the resolution. Redlines to procedures are included in this category.
2. If the discrepancy is minor and affects procedure functionality but not flight hardware fit or function, it shall be recorded in the D-log. Resolution shall be in consultation with the TD and approved by the QA representative.

3. All critical and major discrepancies, those that effect flight hardware fit or functions, shall be documented in a D-log and also in a Discrepancy Report, per P0108.

D TEST PERSONNEL

D.1 Personnel Responsibilities

The performance of this procedure requires a minimum complement of personnel as determined by the Test Director. The person performing the operations (Test Director or Test Engineer) is to sign the “Completed by” sign-off. Any other qualified person or QA person who can attest to the successful performance of this procedure may sign the “Witnessed by” sign-off. ***The Test Director will perform Pre-Test and Post-Test Briefings in accordance with P0875 “GP-B Maintenance and Testing at all Facilities.” Checklists will be used as directed by P0875***

D.2 Personnel Qualifications

The Test Director must have a detailed understanding of all procedures and facility operations and experience in all of the SMD operations. Test Engineers must have SMD Cryogenic operations experience and an understanding of the operations and procedures used for the cryogenic servicing/maintenance of the Dewar.

D.3 Required Personnel

The following personnel are essential to the accomplishment of this procedure:

FUNCTIONAL TITLE	NUMBER	AFFILIATION
Test Director/Test Engineer	1	Stanford
GP-B Quality Assurance	1	Stanford

E REQUIREMENTS

E.1 Electrostatic Discharge Requirements

When working on the space vehicle, proper ESD protection is required. A properly grounded ESD wrist strap must be worn while mating to or de-mating from payload connectors. Wrist-strap must be checked on an appropriate calibrated checker prior to use.

E.2 Lifting Operation Requirements

There are no lifting operations in this procedure

E.3 Hardware/Software Requirements**E.3.1 Commercial Test Equipment**

No commercial test equipment is required for this operation.

E.3.2 Ground Support Equipment

No GSE is required for this operation other than that described in Section E.3.3.

E.3.3 Computers and Software:

The TM&A together with its associated laptop computer and LabView data acquisition program are required for this operation.

E.4 Additional Test Equipment**E.4.1 Additional Hardware**

None

E.4.2 Tools

Wrist Strap

E.4.3 Expendables

No expendables are required.

E.5 Configuration Requirements**E.5.1 Main Tank**

Liquid in the Main Tank may be at its normal boiling point (NBP) or subatmospheric.

E.5.2 Guard Tank

The Guard Tank may contain liquid or be depleted.

E.5.3 Well

The Well is evacuated.

E.5.4 SMD Vacuum Shell

The Vacuum Shell pressure should be less than 5×10^{-5} torr, but the actual pressure has no bearing on the performance of this procedure.

E.5.5 Optional Non-flight Configurations.

The following modifications or non-flight arrangement of the basic SMD configuration may also be in place. They are incidental to the performance of this procedure and not required.

1. The SMD may be installed in its transportation and test fixture.
2. The Vacuum shell pump out port at SV-14 may be connected to the Vacuum Module (P/N 5833816) via a 2-in valve and pumping line, with the valve in either the closed position or in the open position. The Vacuum Module pump may be; off, actively pumping the pumping line up to a closed SV-6, or actively pumping the vacuum shell.
3. The ion-pump magnet may be installed.

F REFERENCE DOCUMENTS**F.1 Drawings**

<i>Drawing No.</i>	<i>Title</i>
LMMS-5833394	<i>Instrumentation Installation</i>

F.2 Supporting documentation

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Title</i>
LMMC-5835031	GP-B Magnetic Control Plan
GPB-100153C	SMD Safety Compliance Assessment
LM/P479945	Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package
SU/GP-B P0141	FIST Emergency Procedures
LMSC-P088357	Science Mission Dewar Critical Design Review
SU/GP-B P0108	Quality Plan
LMMS GPB-100333	Science Mission Dewar Failure Effects and Causes Analysis
SU/GP-B P059	GP-B Contamination Control Plan
EM SYS229	Accident/Mishap/Incident Notification Process
EWR 127-1	Eastern and Western Range Safety Requirements
KHB 1710.2 rev E	KSC Safety Practices Handbook

F.3 Additional Procedures

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Title</i>
SU/GP-B P0879	Accident/Incident/Mishap Notification Process
SU/GP-B P0775	Certification of the TM&A

Operation Number: _____

Date Initiated: _____

Time Initiated: _____

G OPERATIONS


G.1 Pre-Operations Verifications

- o Verify SU QA notified.
Record: Individual notified _____,
Date/time ____/____.
- o Verify NASA program representative notified.
Record: Individual notified _____,
Date/time ____/____.
- o Record calibration due dates in Table 1 (Sections. E.3.4, E.4)
- o Persons actually performing this procedure should list their names in Sec D.3.
- o Verify completion of the pre-operations checklist (Appendix 1).
- o Verify proper operation of GP-B Cryogenic Team oxygen monitor
- o Verify availability and function of emergency shower.
- o Verify connection of burst disk emergency vent lines

Section Complete QA Witness: _____

G.2 Verify Configuration Requirements

G.2.1 Verify that the TM&A is set up as shown below.. The cable connections to the SMD/PAYLOAD are K/A-D-G (K = 63-pin female, A, D and G = 66-pin female) and two 5-conductor ENDEVCO cables (male/female, 9-pin D-style connector).



G.2.2 Power down all the TM&A components

<i>Item</i>	<i>Condition</i>	<i>Checked</i>
AC in	Unplugged	
SCXI DC 1000	OFF	
ENDEVCO	OFF	
10 μ A #1 (GRT)	OFF	
10 μ A #1 (SDT)	OFF	
Laptop Computer	OFF	
Horn Defeat	ON	

Section G.2 completed. QA Witness: _____

G.3 Disconnect TM&A from SMD

Caution

Extreme care must be taken to avoid accidentally damaging the connectors. Connectors should be inspected for bent pins and/or debris prior to mating. A properly grounded ESD wrist strap must be worn. All mate/demates involving flight connectors shall be logged. Failure to comply may result in equipment damage.

- G.3.1 Disconnect the TM&A cables from the SMD and to the ENDEVCO heads. Disconnect the laptop computer interface to the SCXI chassis.
- G.3.2 Cable K/A-D-G connects to the interface box (connector K to L) and to the SMD (A to P800, D to P804).
- G.3.3 Disconnect proper shorting plug to the end of cable G P801 and store
- G.3.4 Disconnect the main tank and guard tank ENDEVCO cables to the ENDEVCO heads using the cables EDV MT and EDV GT.
- G.3.5 Disconnect the parallel port of the laptop computer to the SCXI 1200 using the parallel interface cable.
- G.3.6 Verify completion of post operations checklist

Section G.3 completed. QA Witness: _____

H PROCEDURE COMPLETION

Completed by:

Witnessed by:

Date: _____

Time: _____

Quality Manager _____ **Date** _____

Payload Test Director _____ **Date** _____

TM&A CABLING

		A	K	L		1303	1161	other
Device	function	P800/P1			L jumpers			
T22D top lead bag /a	-	-	1	1		GND		
	V+	6	2	2		CH0+		
	V-	12	3	3		CH0-		
	-	-	4	4	10	GND		
GRT	I+	1	5	5			NO(0)	
	I-	5	6	6	11			
T23D top lead bag /b	shield	-	7	7		GND		
	V+	28	8	8		CH1+		
	V-	29	9	9		CH1-		
	shield	-	10	10	34			
GRT	I+	19	11	11	6			
	I-	20	12	12	35			
T09D main tank bottom	shield	-	13	13		GND		
	V+	16	14	14		CH2+		
	V-	23	15	15		CH2-		
	shield	-	16	16		GND		
SDT	I+	9	17	17			NO(1)	
	I-	15	18	18				10uA(-) SDT
T15D guard tank /a	shield	-	19	19		GND		
	V+	7	20	20		CH3+		
	V-	8	21	21		CH3-		
	shield	-	22	22		GND		
SDT	I+	2	23	23			NO(2)	
	I-	3	24	24				10uA(-) SDT
T24D fill valve V13	shield	-	25	25		GND		
	V+	11	26	26		CH4+		
	V-	18	27	27		CH4-		
	shield	-	28	28		GND		
SDT	I+	4	29	29			NO(3)	
	I-	10	30	30				10uA(-) SDT
		D	K	L		1303	1161	other
Device	function	P804/P5			L jumpers			
T20D top lead bag /c	-	-	31	31		GND		
	V+	35	32	32		CH5+		
	V-	36	33	33		CH5-		
	-	-	34	34	40			
GRT	I+	26	35	35	12			
	I-	27	36	36	41			
T21D top lead bag /d	shield	-	37	37		GND		
	V+	16	38	38		CH6+		
	V-	23	39	39		CH6-		
	shield	-	40	40	46			
GRT	I+	9	41	41	36			
	I-	15	42	42	47			
		D	K	L		1303	1161	other
Device	function	P801/P2			L jumpers			
T01D station 200 /a	-	-	43	43		GND		
	V+	16	44	44		CH7+		
	V-	23	45	45		CH7-		
GRT	-	-	46	46	52			
	I+	9	47	47	42			
	I-	15	48	48	53			
T10D MT top /a	shield	-	49	49		GND		
	V+	62	50	50		CH8+		
	V-	63	51	51		CH8-		
GRT	shield	-	52	52	46			
	I+	56	53	53	48			
	I-	57	54	54				10uA(-) GRT
T05D VCS-1 Bottom	shield	-	55	55		GND		
	V+	28	56	56		CH9+		
	V-	29	57	57		CH9-		
SDT	shield	-	58	58		GND		

	I+	19	59	59			NO(4)	
	I-	20	60	60				10uA(-) SDT
T08D HEX-4	shield	-	61	61		GND		
	V+	34	62	62		CH10+	NO(5)	
	V-	43	63	63		CH10-		10uA(-) SDT
SDT	shield	-						
	I+	17						
	I-	25						

ENDEVCO and Spare A/D CHANNELS

		1303			1303
spare 63-pin	ENDEVCO		spare 63-pin	ENDEVCO	
	CH1-pin	CH11+	24		GND
	CH1-shield	CH11-	25		CH22+
		GND	26		CH22-
	CH2-pin	CH12+	27		GND
	CH2-shield	CH12-	28		CH23+
		GND	29		CH23-
	CH3-pin	CH13+	30		GND
	CH3-shield	CH13-	31		CH24+
		GND	32		CH24-
1		CH14+	33		GND
2		CH14-	34		CH25+
3		GND	35		CH25-
4		CH15+	36		GND
5		CH15-	37		CH26+
6		GND	38		CH26-
7		CH16+	39		GND
8		CH16-	40		CH27+
9		GND	41		CH27-
10		CH17+	42		GND
11		CH17-	43		CH28+
12		GND	44		CH28-
13		CH18+	45		GND
14		CH18-	46		CH29+
15		GND	47		CH29-
16		CH19+	48		GND
17		CH19-	49		CH30+
18		GND	50		CH30-
19		CH20+	51		GND
20		CH20-	52		CH31+
21		GND	53		CH31-
22		CH21+	54		GND
23		CH21-			

CURRENT SOURCE AND BATTERY TO 1161 RELAY

1161		10 μ A GRT	10 μ A SDT	12VDC
	1161 jumper			
NC(0)				
COM(0)		10 μ A (+)		
NO(0)				
NC(1)				
COM(1)	COM(2)		10 μ A (+)	
NO(1)				
NC(2)				
COM(2)	COM(3)			
NO(2)				
NC(3)				
COM(3)	COM(4)			
NO(3)				
NC(4)				
COM(4)	COM(5)			
NO(4)				
NC(5)				
COM(5)	COM(4)			
NO(5)				
NC(6)				
COM(6)				
NO(6)				
NC(7)				
COM(7)				12 V (+)
NO(7)				

ENDEVCO CABLES

pin #	function	color
4		white
5		green
7		red
8		black
9	shield	none

Sensor end = female 9-pin D-style
Readout end = male 9-pin D-style

I APPENDIX 1 PRETEST CHECKLIST

DATE	CHECKLIST ITEM	COMPLETED	REMARKS
	1. Verify the test procedure being used is the latest revision.		
	2. Verify all critical items in the test are identified and discussed with the test team.		
	3. Verify all required materials and tools are available in the test area.		
	4. Verify all hazardous materials involved in the test are identified to the test team.		
	5. Verify all hazardous steps to be performed are identified to the test team.		
	6. Verify each team member knows their individual responsibilities.		
	7. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she has the authority to stop the test if an item in the procedure is not clear.		
	8. Confirm that each test team member clearly understands that he/she must stop the test if there is any anomaly or suspected anomaly.		
	9. Notify management of all discrepancy reports or d-log items identified during procedure performance. In the event an incident or major discrepancy occurs during procedure performance management will be notified immediately.		
	10. Perform an Engineering and Safety high bay walk down. Ensure all discrepancies are corrected prior to start of operation.		
	11. Confirm that each test team member understands that there will be a post-test team meeting.		
	Team Lead Signature: _____		

J APPENDIX 2 POST-TEST CHECKLIST

DATE	CHECKLIST ITEM	COMPLETED	REMARKS
	1. Verify all steps in the procedure were successfully completed.		
	2. Verify all anomalies discovered during testing are properly documented.		
	3. Ensure management has been notified of all major or minor discrepancies.		
	4. Ensure that all steps that were not required to be performed are properly identified.		
	5. If applicable sign-off test completion.		
	6. Verify all RAV valve operations have been entered in log book		
	7. Verify the as-run copy of procedure has been filed in the appropriate binder		
	Team Lead Signature: _____		

K APPENDIX 3– CONTINGENCY/EMERGENCY RESPONSES

Condition	Circumstance	Response
Power Failure	Anytime	Wait for power restoration, and resume procedure
Burst Disk Rupture	Anytime	Evacuate Room
Oxygen Monitor alarm	Anytime	EvacuateRoom